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Abstract
We test the hypothesis that the effect of foreign aid on economic growth is
positive in ethnically homogenous countries, but decreasing in ethnic frac-
tionalisation. Using panel data covering 114 aid-recipient countries over the
period 1962 to 2001, and employing two-stage least squares and GMM
estimation techniques, we find a strong support for this hypothesis.
Our estimates suggest that foreign aid promotes growth in ethnically
homogenous countries, while being ineffective or even harmful in many
Sub-Saharan African countries and some ethnically fractionalised countries
elsewhere.
JEL classification: C23, F35, F43, O11
1. Introduction
Economists and political activists from Jeffrey Sachs to Bono have long
argued that foreign aid has various positive effects on economic develop-
ment (Sachs, 2005). Recent contributions scrutinising the voluminous
aid-effectiveness literature however find no robust evidence for a positive
effect of foreign aid on economic growth (Doucouliagos and Paldam,
2008; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008). In at least some recipient countries,
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foreign aid must thus have indirect negative effects on economic growth
that offset any positive growth effects.
Svensson (2000) and Hodler (2006) present theoretical models in which
rivalling ethnic groups can divert time and resources away from productive
to rent-seeking activities. These rent-seeking activities are socially wasteful,
but help to channel aid inflows or other public funds towards one’s own
group.1 They may include bribery and corruption, lobbying and political
campaigning, distorted policies as well as intimidation or even violence
and civil warfare. Focusing on the best equilibrium that can be sustained
by trigger strategies in a repeated game, Svensson (2000) shows that an
increase in aid inflows induces all groups to engage in more rent seeking
to ensure that deviations remain unprofitable. His model thus predicts
that there are ‘surprisingly small or in fact even contractible effects on
welfare and public project provision following increased inflows of
foreign aid’ (Svensson, 2000, p. 445) in heterogeneous societies.
Consistent with his model’s predictions, he finds evidence that foreign
aid tends to raise corruption in ethnically fractionalised, but not in ethni-
cally homogenous countries.2
Hodler (2006) adds the assumption that property rights on produced
output are endogenous and their quality decreasing in the share of aggre-
gate resources devoted to rent-seeking activities. Focusing on the one-shot
version of the game, he finds that foreign aid has a direct positive effect on
economic development and an indirect negative effect as foreign aid
increases rent seeking and erodes property rights, thereby making pro-
ductive activities even less attractive. The magnitude of the direct positive
effect is independent of the number of rivalling groups, but the indirect
negative effect becomes larger as the the number of rivalling groups
increases. The reason is that the increase in aggregate rent seeking that
follows higher aid inflows is the larger, the more rivalling groups there
are. As a consequence, the model predicts that the net effect of foreign
aid on economic development is positive if the number of rivalling
1 Hodler (2006) focuses on natural resource rents rather than foreign aid. However, wind-
fall gains in the forms of resource rents and (unconditional) aid inflows are likely to have
similar effects on a country’s economy, its institutions and the political situation, as
argued by Acemoglu et al. (2004), Hodler (2006), Dalgaard and Olsson (2008) and
many others. For dynamic models of rent seeking and windfall gains, see Lane and
Tornell (1996), Tornell and Lane (1999) and Hodler (2007).
2 Knack (2001), Alesina and Weder (2002), Bra¨utigam and Knack (2004) and Djankov et al.
(2008) provide further evidence that foreign aid can foster corruption and undermine the
quality of institutions and governance.
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groups is low, but decreases in the number of rivalling groups and becomes
negative if this number gets sufficiently large.
The models of Svensson (2000) and Hodler (2006) predict that the effect
of foreign aid on economic development should be clearly positive in eth-
nically homogenous countries, but smaller or even negative in countries
with many rivalling ethnic groups.3 In this paper, we test this hypothesis
using panel data covering 114 aid recipient countries over the period
1962 to 2001. We are interested in the growth effects of both foreign aid
and its interaction with the index of ethnic fractionalisation, which
serves as our proxy for the number of rivalling ethnic groups.
Employing two-stage least squares and generalised method of moments
(GMM) estimation techniques, we find a positive coefficient on foreign
aid and a negative coefficient on the interaction term. These findings,
which survive various robustness exercises, support our hypothesis. Our
estimates suggest that foreign aid is effective in promoting economic
growth in relatively ethnically homogenous countries, but that many
Sub-Saharan African countries (and a few countries in Latin America
and elsewhere) are so ethnically fractionalised that foreign aid is likely to
be ineffective or even harmful.
This latter implication is reconcilable with the political reality in various
Sub-Saharan African countries. In Kenya, for example, there has long been
fierce political competition along ethnic lines, and numerous members of
the Kalenjin-dominated government around Daniel arap Moi, who was
president from 1978 to 2002, and the Kikuyu-dominated government
around Mwai Kibaki, who has been president ever since, have extracted
foreign aid and other public funds on a large scale (Wrong, 2009).
Our paper contributes to the aid effectiveness literature, in particular its
newer branch, the so-called conditional aid effectiveness literature
(Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2010), which studies the conditions under
which foreign aid is effective (rather than whether or not foreign aid is
effective in an average country). Despite some doubts about the robustness
of their findings, Burnside and Dollar (2000) must be credited for initiat-
ing the conditional aid effectiveness literature.4 Major contributions to this
3 While Svensson (2000) and Hodler (2006) both focus on rivalling groups divided along
ethnic lines in their empirical applications, their theoretical models can also represent
situations in which rivalling groups differ in some other characteristics. We however
choose to follow Svensson (2000) and Hodler (2006) in focusing on rivalling ethnic
groups.
4 Studies questioning the robustness of the Burnside and Dollar (2000) findings include
Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Lensink and White
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literature include Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001), Dalgaard et al. (2004) and
Angeles and Neanidis (2009).5 Hansen and Tarp find diminishing returns
to foreign aid, i.e., a negative coefficient on aid squared.6 Dalgaard and his
co-authors find that aid is more effective outside the tropics than within. In
particular, they find a positive coefficient on aid, but a negative coefficient
on the interaction term between aid and the fraction of a country’s area
located in the tropics. Angeles and Neanidis hypothesise that aid effective-
ness depends on the size of the local elite, which they proxy by the share of
colonial settlers.7 They indeed find a positive coefficient on aid, but a
negative coefficient on the interaction term between aid and the share of
colonial settlers.
We compare our results to these findings. We find that the interaction
term between aid and ethnic fractionalisation tends to be more robust
than an aid-squared term and the interaction term between aid and the
fraction of a country’s area located in the tropics. We also find evidence
that ethnic fractionalisation and the share of colonial settlers both lower
aid effectiveness. Inspired by Caselli and Coleman (2006), we argue that
this latter finding may suggest that rent-seeking contests for aid inflows
do not only get more detrimental as the number of ethnic groups raises,
but also as the differences in physical appearance across the major ethnic
groups grow larger.
Our paper also relates to the literature on the consequences of ethnic
diversity for economic development. Easterly and Levine (1997) find that
ethnic fractionalisation may be responsible for Sub-Saharan Africa’s poor
growth performance by causing rent seeking, poor policies and weak
institutions.8 We also find that ethnic fractionalisation has a significantly
(2001), Easterly et al. (2004), Roodman (2004, 2007), Jensen and Paldam (2006) and
Doucouliagos and Paldam (2010).
5 Doucouliagos and Paldam (2010) and Roodman (2004, 2007) discuss various contri-
butions to the conditional aid effectiveness literature. Roodman’s robustness exercises
suggest that the findings of Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Dalgaard et al. (2004) tend to
be more robust than other findings in this literature. These robustness exercises do
however not include the most recent contributions, e.g., Angeles and Neanidis (2009)
and also not all of the earlier contributions, e.g., Ovaska (2003).
6 See also Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) and Lensink and White (2001).
7 Bjørnskov (2009) studies in what circumstances foreign aid benefits the local elite.
8 La Porta et al. (1999) and Alesina et al. (2003) also find that ethnic fractionalisation leads
to poor policy outcomes and bad governance; and Miguel and Guerty (2005) illustrate the
negative effect of ethnic divisions on the provision of local public goods in rural Kenya.
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negative effect on economic growth in specifications in which we exclude
the interaction term of foreign aid and ethnic fractionalisation. But when-
ever we include this interaction term, ethnic fractionalisation by itself
becomes insignificant. Hence, our results suggest that ethnic heterogeneity
is not in and of itself detrimental to economic growth, but lowers the effec-
tiveness of foreign aid.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses
our empirical methodology and the data. Section 3 presents our main
results and various robustness exercises. Section 4 concludes.
2. Methodology and data
We employ panel data covering 114 aid-recipient countries over the period
1962 to 2001.9 We use four-year averages of our measures of foreign aid
and economic growth. To test whether the aid–growth relationship
varies systematically with ethnic fractionalisation, we estimate the follow-
ing model:
GROWTHit = a+ b1AIDit + b2ETHNICi + b3(AIDit × ETHNICi)
+ X′itL+ 1it,
where GROWTHit is the average growth rate of real per capita GDP in
country i from year t to year t + 3, AIDit a measure of average yearly aid
inflows in this period, ETHNICi an index of ethnic fractionalisation and
Xit a vector of other control variables.
We are mainly interested in the effect of a change in AIDit on
GROWTHit. The point estimate of this effect is b1 + b2ETHNICi. Our
hypothesis suggests that b1 should be significantly positive and b2
should be significantly negative. The point estimates would then imply
that GROWTHit is increasing in AIDit if ETHNICi is below the threshold
of 2b1/b2, but decreasing in AIDit otherwise.
We use the measures of GROWTHit and AIDit from the extensive data
set compiled by Roodman (2004).10 This data set contains three measures
of aid inflows: Effective development assistance (EDA) relative to real GDP,
net overseas development assistance (ODA) relative to real GDP and ODA
relative to exchange rate GDP, i.e., GDP converted to US dollars using
market exchange rates rather than purchasing power parities (PPP). The
9 Due to data limitations, the panel is unbalanced and not all specifications cover exactly
114 countries.
10 Appendix A provides definitions and sources of all variables used.
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EDA data correct for a number of short-comings in the ODA data and
should therefore be conceptually superior in measuring the true aid
element of grants and loans (Chang et al., 1998). We follow the recent lit-
erature by using EDA-to-real GDP (AIDit) in our baseline specifications,
and ODA-to-real GDP (ODAit
R) as well as ODA-to-exchange rate GDP
(ODAit
X) to check the robustness of our results.
We use the index of ethnic fractionalisation (ETHNICi) by Alesina et al.
(2003) to proxy for the number of rivalling ethnic groups. This index
measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals of a par-
ticular country belong to different ethno-linguistic groups. Hence, higher
scores indicate a more fractionalised country. This index is only available as
a cross section, but we are not concerned by this because the ethnic com-
position of countries tends to be very slow moving (Alesina et al., 2003).
We also use the similarly constructed indices of linguistic and religious
fractionalisation (LANGUAGEi and RELIGIONi). Table 1 provides
summary statistics for our three main variables — GROWTHit, AIDit
and ETHNICi — based on all observations used in our baseline
specifications.
Following the literature, our control variables include ‘initial’ real
PPP-adjusted GDP per capita in year t (GDPit), and a dummy variable
for the fast-growing East Asian countries.11 Over the period 1962 to
2001, the average growth rate in these countries was close with 5% com-
pared with 1% in the rest of the sample.
Many studies in the aid effectiveness literature further add control vari-
ables that proxy for fiscal, monetary and trade policies, institutional
quality, political stability and governance. We refrain from adding such
control variables. The models of Svensson (2000) and Hodler (2006)
suggest that the rent-seeking activities caused by aid inflows into ethnically
diverse countries go hand-in-hand with poor policies and may lead to a
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Number of
observations
Mean Standard
deviation
Minimum Maximum
GROWTHit 763 0.013 0.042 20.425 0.165
AIDit 763 0.014 0.024 20.005 0.237
ETHNICi 114 0.492 0.261 0.000 0.930
11 This dummy, which is also taken from Roodman (2004), is equal to one for China,
Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
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deterioration in institutional quality. The resulting rent-seeking contestsare
also likely to be associated with political instability and bad governance.
These models therefore predict that, in fractionalised countries, foreign
aid has an indirect negative effect on economic growth, which may well
work via rent seeking, poor policies, bad governance, political instability
and weak institutions. We can therefore only test our hypothesis whether
we exclude these variables. Otherwise, we would be testing whether
ethnic fractionalisation impacts upon the aid–growth relationship
through some channel unrelated to policies, governance, political stability
and institutional quality.
For similar reasons, we follow the literature in not controlling for invest-
ment in our main specification. Investment is a very proximate cause of
economic growth (e.g., Rodrik, 2003). When controlling for investment,
one would test whether ethnic fractionalisation impacts upon the aid–
growth relationship through some channel that leaves investment unaf-
fected. However, we would like to test whether ethnic fractionalisation
impacts upon the aid–growth relationship in general, i.e., including
through all the channels that affect investment. We can only test this
latter hypothesis when we exclude investment from our main specification.
We however return to the role of investment below.
To reduce the possibility of omitted variables biasing the relationship
between aid and growth, we add year dummies to account for time
varying common shocks, and regional dummies to control for regional
fixed effects (both of which are omitted in most other contributions to
the aid effectiveness literature).12 The instrumental variables approach
that we adopt will also help to identify the causal relationship between
aid and growth.
As a positive side-effect of excluding policy, governance and institutional
variables, our sample contains a larger cross section of countries than pre-
vious studies. Our baseline specifications are based on 763 observations
from 114 countries, while the baseline specification is based on, for
example, 275 observations from 56 countries in Burnside and Dollar
(2000), and 449 observations from 67 countries in Angeles and Neanidis
(2009). As policy, governance and institutional variables tend to be
missing more often for countries with poor policies, bad governance,
12 The regions are East Asia and the Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America
and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia and Sub-Saharan
Africa. Given that we follow the literature by including a dummy for the fast-growing
East Asian countries (see above), we are in fact dividing East Asia and the Pacific into
two groups: the fast-growing East Asian countries and the rest.
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weak institutions and low growth rates, we expect our results to be less
prone to sample selection bias than those of previous studies.
The potential endogeneity of foreign aid has been the main challenge in
the empirical aid effectiveness literature. We follow the literature in choos-
ing estimation techniques that help to address this potential endogeneity.
The first technique that we use is two-stage least squares (2SLS).
Following the literature (e.g., Boone, 1996; Burnside and Dollar, 2000;
Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Dalgaard et al., 2004; Angeles and Neanidis,
2009), we use as instruments for AIDit a dummy for the Franc zone
(FRZi), a dummy for Central American countries (CAMi), a dummy for
Egypt (EGYi), arms imports divided by GDP (ARMSit) and log population
size (POPit). These instruments are inspired by various studies, showing
that strategic and cultural ties are important determinants of aid flows.
Countries in the Franc zone and Central America receive more aid from
France and the USA, respectively, for cultural reasons unrelated to econ-
omic performance, while Egypt receives more aid for geopolitical
reasons. Donors also tend to give more aid per capita to small countries
as well as to countries that have arms deals with them, again for reasons
unrelated to economic performance. We deviate from most of the literature
by not using lagged aid as an instrument in our 2SLS estimates, as average
growth in, say, the period from 1998 to 2001 may well depend on aid
inflows in, say, 1997, which would violate the instrument exogeneity
requirement. To ensure that our set of instruments is sufficiently strong
despite dropping lagged aid, we add quadratics of ARMSit and POPit.
13
Since, we need to instrument for AIDit as well as its interaction with
ETHNICi, we also add ARMSit × ETHNICi and POPit × ETHNICi to
our set of instruments.14
We further address the potential endogeneity of foreign aid also by using
the generalised method of moments GMM panel estimators of Arellano
and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). These estimators have
become increasingly popular in the aid effectiveness literature (e.g.,
Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Dalgaard et al., 2004; Roodman, 2004; Rajan
and Subramanian, 2008; Angeles and Neanidis, 2009). They make use of
standard instruments, such as those discussed above, but expand the
instrument set to improve the efficiency of the first-stage regression. The
13 Dividing arms imports by GDP rather than total imports also helps to avoid weak
instrument problems.
14 Further adding ARMSit
2 × ETHNICi and POPit2 × ETHNICi to our set of instruments
does not lead to any noticeable change in our results.
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Arellano–Bond estimator converts endogenous variables into first differ-
ences and uses lagged levels of the endogenous variables to instrument
for these differences, which is why it is commonly referred to as the
difference-GMM estimator. The Blundell–Bond estimator adds the levels
of the endogenous variables to the system to be instrumented and uses
the lagged first differences as additional instruments. This is known as
the system-GMM estimator.15 We apply these GMM estimators using a
two-step estimation process, which tends to be more efficient than a
one-step process, and the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction to
adjust the standard errors. To avoid dynamic panel bias, we treat AIDit
and AIDit × ETHNICi as well as GDPit as endogenous variables.16
Besides addressing the potential endogeneity of aid, these GMM estima-
tors have the added advantage that they ‘incorporate (implicitly) fixed
effects’ (Rajan and Subramanian, 2008, p. 644). The possibility to
control for unobserved country-specific heterogeneity is particularly valu-
able in our study, in which we cannot control for policy and governance
variables because of the hypothesized channels through which ethnic frac-
tionalisation impacts upon aid effectiveness.
When employing these GMM panel estimators, we use only endogenous
variables that are lagged at least twice as instruments. When the number of
lags of the endogenous variables used as instruments is otherwise unrest-
ricted, GMM panel estimators may create numerous instruments that
‘can overfit the instrumented variables’ (Roodman, 2004, p. 25).
Therefore, we mostly use only the second and third lags of the endogenous
variables as instruments, but we also report the results when using all
endogenous variables lagged at least twice, and when collapsing the set
of instruments using the method proposed by Roodman (2009).
3. Findings
Table 2 presents our main results using pooled OLS and, more importantly,
2SLS. In Columns 1 and 2 we look at the effects of AIDit and ETHNICi on
GROWTHit in the absence of the interaction term AIDit × ETHNICi. We
find that the effect of AIDit is not significantly different from zero, while
ETHNICi has a significant negative effect. The former result suggests
15 These estimators both have their limitations. The difference-GMM estimator often leads
to a weak instruments problem, while the system-GMM is only valid if the lagged differ-
ences are orthogonal to the fixed effects.
16 This implies that we use lagged aid as instrument for current aid in our GMM estimates.
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Table 2: Main results (OLS and 2SLS)
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
GROWTHit GROWTHit GROWTHit GROWTHit GROWTHit GROWTHit INVit
AIDit 20.170 0.223 0.507 1.399 1.249 2.000 6.125
(0.465) (0.202) (0.176) (0.034) (0.044) (0.028) (0.030)
ETHNICi 20.031 20.031 20.016 20.005 20.007 0.004 0.035
(0.000) (0.000) (0.158) (0.750) (0.635) (0.841) (0.588)
AIDit*ETHNICi 21.066 21.874 21.822 22.636 26.771
(0.139) (0.053) (0.058) (0.051) (0.081)
GDPit 20.001 0.004 20.002 0.003 20.001 0.002 0.047
(0.836) (0.369) (0.750) (0.554) (0.896) (0.632) (0.004)
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Regional dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Implied threshold 2b1/b3 (0.48) 0.75 0.69 0.76 0.90
Countries 114 114 114 114 114 92 114
Observations 763 763 763 763 752 626 763
R2 0.158 0.200 0.176 0.209 0.239 0.188 0.199
Hansen J-test (p-value) — 0.244 — 0.342 0.484 0.321 0.798
Omitted observations Statistical outliers Countries with low
or high ETHNICi
Notes: p-values in parentheses are based on robust and clustered standard errors. In all 2SLS regressions, exogenous variables used as
instruments include FRZi, CAMi, EGYi, POPit, POPit
2, ARMSit and ARMSit
2. In addition, POPit*ETHNICi and ARMSit*ETHNICi are used in Columns
4–7. In Column 5, outliers are removed using the Hadi (1992) procedure (see footnote 21 for details). The outliers are GAB 1974–1977; GNB
1974–1977, 1982–1985, 1986–1989; IRQ 1990–1993; JOR 1974–1977, 1978–1981, 1982–1985; LBR 1990–1993, 1998–2001 and SOM
1974–1977. In Column 6, countries with ETHNICi below the 10th or above the 90th percentile are omitted.
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that foreign aid has no effect in an average aid-recipient country, which is
consistent with the findings of various recent contributions to the aid effec-
tiveness literature (Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2008; Rajan and
Subramanian, 2008); and the latter result is consistent with the findings
of Easterly and Levine (1997), who argue that ethnic divisions may be
responsible for Sub-Saharan Africa’s poor growth performance. In
addition, the effect of GDPit is also insignificant.
17
In Column 3, we use pooled OLS to estimate our baseline specification,
which includes the interaction term AIDit × ETHNICi. The coefficients on
AIDit and the interaction term have the predicted signs, but are statistically
insignificant. In Column 4, we address the potential endogeneity of AIDit
and AIDit × ETHNICi using 2SLS with the set of instruments discussed in
the previous section. The Hansen J-test is often used to assess the validity
of the instruments. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the excluded
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and, therefore, exogen-
ous.18 We find that the coefficient on AIDit is positive and statistically sig-
nificant (with a p-value of 0.034), while the coefficient on AIDit ×
ETHNICi is negative and statistically significant (with a p-value of
0.053). These results support our hypothesis. In particular, the former
result suggests that the effect of AIDit on GROWTHi is unambiguously
positive in ethnically homogenous countries (where ETHNICi ¼ 0),
while the later result suggests that the effect of AIDit on GROWTHit
decreases in ETHNICi. In Figure 1, following Brambor et al. (2006), we
present the effect of AIDit on GROWTHit as well as the associated standard
errors for all possible levels of ETHNICi. The effect of AIDit on GROWTHit
is significantly positive for low levels of ETHNICi, but becomes insignifi-
cant for high levels of ETHNICi. The point estimates suggest that this
effect turns negative once ETHNICi exceeds the threshold level of 0.75.
This is the case in 21 of the 114 countries in our baseline sample, including
20 of the 43 Sub-Saharan African countries. In these countries, the positive
17 In all OLS and 2SLS estimates presented in the paper, the coefficients on the dummies for
the first four 4-year periods tend to be higher than the dummies for the six later 4-year
periods. Moreover, when omitting the dummy for Sub-Saharan African countries, then
the dummy for the fast-growing East Asian countries is positive and highly significant,
and the South Asia dummy is also positive and significant in most specifications, while
all other regional dummies are insignificant.
18 Also the Anderson canonical correlations LR test is sometimes used to assess the
relevance of the instruments. In all 2SLS estimates presented in this paper, the null
hypothesis can be easily rejected, which suggests that the models are identified and
the instruments relevant.
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effects of foreign aid are presumably offset by the negative consequences of
the provoked rent-seeking contests among rivalling ethnic groups.
To get an idea how sizeable the effect of ethnic fractionalisation on aid
effectiveness is, let us first consider the case of Uganda. Uganda is the
most ethnically fractionalised country in the world with ETHNICUGA ¼
0.930. Over the period 1998 to 2001, it received EDA equal to only 1.2%
of its GDP, and its average yearly growth rate was 2.5%. Our point estimates
suggest that the contribution of these aid inflows to its growth rate was
20.4%, i.e., that Uganda would have grown at a rate of 2.9% in the
absence of foreign aid. However, the contribution of these aid inflows to
its growth rate would have been 0.6% if Uganda were about as ethnically
fractionalised as the average country in our sample (such as Nicaragua
or Venezuela), and even 1.7% if Uganda were perfectly ethnically hom-
ogenous (such as Comoros).19
Sierra Leone is another highly fractionalised country with
ETHNICSLE ¼ 0.820. In the 1980s, Sierra Leone was a country strongly
influenced by tribal and power politics, where corruption and rent
seeking were allegedly rife (Reno, 1995). In the period 1986 to 1989,
EDA inflows averaged 1.5% of GDP. Over this period, real GDP on
average declined by 1.6% a year. According to our estimates, these aid
inflows may have contributed to declining GDP by adding to the incentives
to engage in rent-seeking activities, with aid inflows estimated to have
Figure 1: Aid Effectiveness and Ethnic Fractionalisation (2SLS Estimates)
19 These contributions are calculated as follows: (1.399–1.874 × 0.930)0.012 ¼ 20.004,
(1.399–1.874 × 0.492)0.012 ¼ 0.006, and 1.399 × 0.012 ¼ 0.017.
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contributed 20.2% a year to growth. In comparison, if Sierra Leone had
been as ethnically fractionalised as the average country, aid would have
raised the growth by 0.7% a year, and even by 2.1% with perfect ethnic
homogeneity.20 These counterfactuals highlight that the effect of ethnic
fractionalisation on aid effectiveness is not only statistically, but also econ-
omically significant.
While we are mainly interested in the effects of AIDit and AIDit ×
ETHNICi on GROWTHit, it is also noteworthy that ETHNICi becomes
insignificant whenever the interaction term AIDit × ETHNICi is included.
This result suggests that ethnic heterogeneity in and of itself does not have
a negative effect on economic growth, but acts to lower the effectiveness of
foreign aid.
In Column 5, we account for the possibility that outliers may drive our
results by using the Hadi (1992) procedure to identify and remove outliers.
In the absence of outliers, the coefficients of interest are of similar magni-
tude and statistical significance as and when the full sample is used.21 In
Column 6, we omit the 10% least and the 10% most ethnically fractiona-
lised countries from our sample. We again find that the coefficients of
interest remain significant, and they become even somewhat larger in
magnitude.
As investment is generally seen as a very proximate determinant of econ-
omic growth, we expect AIDit and AIDit × ETHNICi to have qualitatively
similar effects on investment (INVit) as they have on economic growth.
This is confirmed by the results in Column 7, where the dependent variable
is INVit rather than GROWTHit.
Table 3 presents our main results using GMM estimation techniques to
address the potential endogeneity of foreign aid as well as to account for
country-specific unobserved heterogeneity. In Columns 1 and 2, we
employ the system-GMM estimator using only the second and third lags
of the endogenous variables as instruments. The Hansen J-test suggests
in both cases that the exogeneity of the instruments cannot be rejected;
20 These contributions are calculated as follows: (1.399–1.874 × 0.820)0.015= 2 0.002,
(1.399–1.874 × 0.492)0.015 ¼ 0.007 and 1.399 × 0.015 ¼ 0.021.
21 The Hadi (1992) procedure is used by, e.g., Roodman (2004) and Angeles and Neanidis
(2009). We use a 5% significance level to remove outliers to the partial scatter plot of
GROWTHit against the predicted values of AIDit × ETHNICi after projection onto the
instruments. The countries with most outliers are Guinea-Bissau and Jordan (as noted
in Table 2). Our results also survive if we only exclude any or both of these two countries,
or if we use other standard tests for outliers based on Cook’s Distance, DFITS and the
standardized residuals.
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Table 3: Main Results (GMM)
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GMM (SYS) GMM (SYS) GMM (SYS) GMM (SYS) GMM (SYS) GMM (DIFF) GMM (SYS)
GROWTHit GROWTHit GROWTHit GROWTHit GROWTHit GROWTHit INVit
AIDit 20.036 0.776 0.697 0.718 1.395 1.658 2.111
(0.765) (0.005) (0.036) (0.009) (0.000) (0.105) (0.004)
AIDit*ETHNICi 21.577 21.220 21.407 22.212 23.111 23.730
(0.001) (0.009) (0.005) (0.002) (0.072) (0.011)
GDPit 0.002 20.002 20.003 20.002 0.001 20.020 0.053
(0.637) (0.524) (0.371) (0.603) (0.915) (0.111) (0.000)
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Regional dummies NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Implied threshold 2b1/b2 0.49 0.57 0.51 0.63 (0.53) 0.57
Countries 114 114 92 114 114 107 114
Observations 763 763 626 763 763 649 763
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.245 0.470 0.572 0.495 0.117 0.333 0.488
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.930 0.833 0.975 0.855 0.753 0.517 0.021
GMM instrument count 36 56 56 76 34 58 56
Lags of endogenous
variables used
as instruments
Two and
three lags
Two and
three lags
Two and
three lags
Unrestricted
starting with
two lags
Unrestricted starting
with two lags
and collapsed set
Unrestricted
starting with
two lags
Two and
three lags
Omitted observations Countries
with low or
high ETHNICi
Notes: p-values in parentheses are based on robust standard errors and the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction. In all columns,
exogenous variables used as instruments include FRZi, CAMi, EGYi, POPit, POPit
2, ARMSit and ARMSit
2. In addition, POPit*ETHNICi and
ARMSit*ETHNICi are used in Columns 2–7. In Column 3, countries with ETHNICi below the 10th or above the 90th percentile are omitted.
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and the Arellano–Bond test for AR(2) fails to reject the null hypothesis of
no autocorrelation.22 In Column 1, we again find that AIDit has no signifi-
cant effect on GROWTHit on average, i.e., when excluding the interaction
term. Our main GMM specification in Column 2 suggests again that the
effect of AIDit on GROWTHit is significant in ethnically homogenous
countries, but decreases as countries become more ethnically fractiona-
lised. Figure 2 presents the implied effect of AIDit on GROWTHit and
the associated standard errors for all possible levels of ETHNICi. Like
our 2SLS estimates, our GMM estimates suggest that the effect of AIDit
on GROWTHit is significantly positive at low levels of ETHNICi. But
unlike our 2SLS estimates, our GMM estimates further suggest that this
effect is significantly negative at high levels of ETHNICi. They also imply
somewhat lower threshold levels of ETHNICi. In particular, the point esti-
mates suggest that the indirect negative effects of foreign aid may offset its
direct positive effects in considerably more than half of the countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa as well as in some fractionalised countries in Latin
America and elsewhere.23
In Column 3, we again exclude the 10% least and the 10% most ethni-
cally fractionalised countries from our samples. In Column 4, we employ
Figure 2: Aid Effectiveness and Ethnic Fractionalisation (GMM Estimates)
22 The appropriate null hypothesis is absence of second-order autocorrelation because first-
differencing of endogenous variables directly induces first-order autocorrelation.
23 The point estimates in Column 2 suggest a threshold level of 0.51. ETHNICi exceeds 0.51
in 58 of the 114 countries in our baseline sample, including 34 Sub-Saharan African and
10 Latin American countries.
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all possible lags of the endogenous variables as instruments starting from
the second lag. In Column 5, we collapse the set of instruments using
the method proposed by Roodman (2009). In all instances, the coefficients
of interest show the predicted signs and remain highly significant. In
Column 6, we show that the coefficients of interest have the predicted
signs and are close to being significant even when using the
difference-GMM estimator. In addition, we again show in Column 7,
that AIDit and AIDit × ETHNICi have similar effects on investment as
they have on economic growth.
In the remainder of this section we present further robustness exercises
based on the 2SLS regression of Column 4 of Table 2, and the system-GMM
regression of Column 2 of Table 3. We have argued before that our bare-
boned baseline specification is appropriate to test how ethnic fractionalisa-
tion impacts upon aid effectiveness through all possible channels.
Nevertheless, we look whether our results are robust to the addition of
further control variables. We start by adding a measure of trade openness
(TRADEit) to our baseline specification in all columns of Table 4, as a con-
siderable share of aid inflows is typically used to finance imports. We then
add geographical variables, namely distance from the equator
(LATITUDEi) and the fraction of a country’s area located in the tropics
(TROPICSi). As a next step, we further control for institutional quality
by adding the indices of political rights (POLITICALit) and civil liberties
(CIVILit) from Freedom House, which are both inverse measures of insti-
tutional quality. In a further step, we include investment (INVit), which is a
particularly close determinant of economic growth. Finally, we add govern-
ment expenditures (GOVit) as a measure of fiscal policies. We find that the
coefficients on AIDit and the interaction term still show the predicted signs
and remain statistically significant at least at the 10% level, while all control
variables other than investment are generally insignificant.24
In Table 5, we test whether our results are robust to the use of alternative
measures of foreign aid. We replace AIDit by the two ODA-based aid
measures ODAit
R and ODAit
X in our baseline 2SLS and GMM regressions.
We note that the coefficients on these aid measures and their interactions
with ETHNICi have the predicted signs and are statistically significant in all
four regressions, except that ODAit
X × ETHNICi is marginally insignificant
in Column 3.
24 Not surprisingly, the GMM results also continue to hold when controlling for the time-
invariant geographical variables LATITUDEi and TROPICSi.
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Table 4: Additional Control Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS GMM GMM GMM GMM
AIDit 1.204 2.894 2.775 2.771 2.676 0.693 0.524 0.453 0.541
(0.060) (0.050) (0.030) (0.029) (0.063) (0.018) (0.075) (0.102) (0.058)
ETHNICi 20.007 0.025 0.028 0.027 0.026
(0.604) (0.316) (0.253) (0.257) (0.330)
AIDit*ETHNICi 21.655 23.819 23.657 23.678 23.472 21.508 21.293 21.137 21.172
(0.076) (0.058) (0.033) (0.030) (0.062) (0.002) (0.006) (0.013) (0.009)
TRADEit 0.002 20.003 20.004 20.006 20.004 0.007 0.011 0.006 0.005
(0.482) (0.652) (0.597) (0.377) (0.557) (0.196) (0.041) (0.196) (0.285)
LATITUDEi 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.513) (0.428) (0.541) (0.510)
TROPICSi 20.003 20.002 20.001 20.003
(0.829) (0.924) (0.933) (0.853)
POLITICALit 20.002 20.002 20.002 20.003 20.002 20.002
(0.499) (0.455) (0.427) (0.157) (0.210) (0.229)
CIVILit 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.603) (0.523) (0.504) (0.530) (0.389) (0.471)
INVit 0.047 0.045 0.091 0.092
(0.112) (0.134) (0.001) (0.001)
GOVit 20.039 20.032
(0.249) (0.162)
GDPit YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Regional dummies YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO
Implied threshold 2b1/b3 0.73 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.77 0.46 0.41 (0.40) 0.46
(continued on next page)
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Table 4: Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS GMM GMM GMM GMM
Countries 763 696 591 591 591 763 656 656 656
Observations 114 93 93 93 93 114 114 114 114
R2 0.222 0.173 0.161 0.169 0.174 — — — —
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.242 0.370 0.282 0.174 0.114 0.467 0.489 0.495 0.436
AR(2) test (p-value) — — —– — — 0.531 0.754 0.834 0.851
GMM instrument count — — — — 57 57 58 59
Notes: Dependent variable is GROWTHit. p-values in parentheses are based on robust and clustered standard errors in 2SLS regressions, and on
robust standard errors and the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction in GMM regressions. In GMM regressions, system-GMM is used with
the second and third lags of the endogenous variables as instruments. In all columns, exogenous variables used as instruments are FRZi, CAMi,
EGYi, POPit, POPit
2, POPit*ETHNICi, ARMSit, ARMSit
2 and ARMSit*ETHNICi.
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In Table 6, we test whether our results are robust to the use of alternative
measures of diversity and fractionalisation, as well as when addressing the
potential endogeneity of ethnic fractionalisation. Our baseline specifica-
tion assumes that the effect of ethnic fractionalisation on aid effectiveness
is linear. We test for potential non-linearities by using a set of dummy vari-
ables indicating the quintiles of the distribution of ETHNICi. We construct
the dummy variables QUINTILEki for k ¼ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, where
QUINTILEki ¼ 1 if and only if ETHNICi belongs to the kth quintile of
ETHNICi. In Columns 1 and 2, we use these dummy variables and their
interactions with AIDit. The 2SLS and GMM point estimates suggest that
the effect of ethnic fractionalisation on aid effectiveness is indeed linear
Table 5: Alternative Measures of Aid
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM
ODARit 0.771 0.450
(0.037) (0.003)
ODAXit 0.354 0.162
(0.063) (0.015)
ETHNICi 20.006 20.002
(0.659) (0.897)
ODARit*ETHNICi 20.938 20.994
(0.068) (0.001)
ODAXit*ETHNICi 20.444 20.193
(0.103) (0.019)
GDPit YES YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES
Regional dummies YES NO YES NO
Implied threshold 2b1/b3 0.82 0.45 (0.80) 0.84
Countries 114 114 114 114
Observations 763 763 748 748
R2 0.215 — 0.208 —
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.341 0.389 0.330 0.489
AR(2) test (p-value) — 0.924 — 0.596
GMM instrument count — 66 — 66
Notes: Dependent variable is GROWTHit. p-values in parentheses are based on robust and
clustered standard errors in 2SLS regressions, and on robust standard errors and the
Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction in GMM regressions. In GMM regressions,
system-GMM is used with the second and third lags of the endogenous variables as
instruments. In all columns, exogenous variables used as instruments are FRZi, CAMi, EGYi,
POPit, POPit
2, POPit*ETHNICi, ARMSit, ARMSit
2 and ARMSit*ETHNICi.
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Table 6: Alternative Measures and Instruments for Fractionalisation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM
AIDit*QUINTILE1i 1.195 0.230
(0.089) (0.463)
AIDit* QUINTILE2i 1.136 0.212
(0.035) (0.202)
AIDit* QUINTILE3i 0.292 0.132
(0.360) (0.567)
AIDit* QUINTILE4i 0.149 20.190
(0.830) (0.431)
AIDit* QUINTILE5i 20.134 20.411
(0.576) (0.117)
AIDit 0.349 0.160 0.444 0.012 2.331 0.951
(0.222) (0.431) (0.063) (0.934) (0.033) (0.009)
LANGUAGEi 20.017
(0.133)
AIDit*LANGUAGEi 20.431 20.653
(0.316) (0.057)
RELIGIONi 0.016
(0.261)
AIDit*RELIGIONi 20.509 20.067
(0.443) (0.819)
ETHNICi 0.029
(0.357)
AIDit *ETHNICi 23.180 21.750
(0.067) (0.005)
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GDPit YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Regional dummies YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Quintile dummies YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Implied threshold 2b1/b3 — — (0.81) (0.25) (0.87) (0.18) 0.73 0.54
Countries 114 114 108 108 114 114 93 93
Observations 763 763 736 736 763 763 681 681
R2 0.177 — 0.223 — 0.172 — 0.263 —
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.117 0.517 0.478 0.738 0.255 0.301 0.408 0.475
AR(2) test (p-value) — 0.940 — 0.964 — 0.937 0.840
GMM instrument count — 116 — 56 — 56 56
Notes: Dependent variable is GROWTHit. p-values in parentheses are based on robust and clustered standard errors in 2SLS regressions, and on
robust standard errors and the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction in GMM regressions. In GMM regressions, system-GMM is used with
the second and third lags of the endogenous variables as instruments. In all columns, exogenous variables used as instruments include FRZi,
CAMi, EGYi, POPit
2 and ARMSit
2. In addition, the interactions of POPit and ARMSit with each of the quintile dummies are used in Columns 1–2;
POPit, POPit*LANGUAGEi, ARMSit and ARMSit*LANGUAGEi are used in Columns 3–4; POPit, POPit*RELIGIONi, ARMSit and ARMSit*RELIGIONi
are used in Columns 5–6; and ORIGTIMEi, STATEHISTi, POPit, POPit*ORIGTIMEi, POPit*STATEHISTi, ARMSit, ARMSit*ORIGTIMEi and
ARMSit*STATEHISTi are used in Columns 7–8.
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or, at least, monotonic.25 While most of the interaction terms are statisti-
cally insignificant, the difference between AIDit × QUINTILE1i and
AIDit × QUINTILE5i is statistically significant at the 10% level in both
columns. This significant difference suggests that foreign aid is indeed
more effective in promoting economic growth in the ethnically least frac-
tionalised countries than in the ethnically most fractionalised countries.
In Columns 3 to 6, we replace ETHNICi by the indices of linguistic and
religious fractionalisation (LANGUAGEi and RELIGIONi). The coeffi-
cients on AIDit and its interaction with these indices still show the pre-
dicted signs, but most of them are relatively close to zero and statistically
insignificant. These results suggest that the hypothesised rent-seeking con-
tests for aid inflows mainly occur along ethnic lines rather than religious or
purely linguistic lines.26 Caselli and Coleman (2006) provide a plausible
explanation for such a pattern. They present a model in which conflicts
over resources, say aid inflows, emerge if winners can easily identify
losers and prevent them from infiltration when it comes to sharing the
spoils of victory. They argue that not all distinctions are equally effective
ways of ensuring that group members can be identified, with differences
in physical appearance being more infiltration-proof than linguistic or reli-
gious differences.
While the empirical literature has so far assumed ethnic diversity to be
exogenous, Ahlerup and Olsson (2011) show that ethnic fractionalisation is
systematically related to the duration of human settlement since prehistoric
times (ORIGTIMEi), and to Putterman’s (2007) State Antiquity Index
(STATEHISTi). This index measures the extent to which a political entity
above the tribal level existed in the state’s present territory in the years 1
to 1950 C.E. In Columns 7 and 8, we therefore address the potential endo-
geneity of ethnic fractionalisation by employing ORIGTIMEi and
STATEHISTi and their interactions with ARMSit and POPit as instruments
for ETHNICi and its interaction with AIDit. The coefficients of interest still
show the predicted signs and retain their statistical significance.27
25 That is, the coefficient on AIDit × QUINTILEmi is strictly higher than the coefficient on
AIDit × QUINTILEni if and only if m, n.
26 As mentioned in footnote 3, the theoretical models of Svensson (2000) and Hodler
(2006) are in principle silent about the relevant dividing lines between rivalling
groups. The insignificant results in Columns 3–6 of Table 6, however, support their
emphasis on rivalling groups that are separated along ethnic lines.
27 When adding ORIGTIMEi and STATEHISTi and their interactions with AIDit as
additional control variables in the second-stage regression (while taking ETHNICi as
exogenous), our coefficients of interest still show the expected signs, but become
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In Table 7, we compare our hypothesis to other findings and hypotheses
advanced in the conditional aid effectiveness literature. We thereby focus
on the finding of Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001) that there are decreasing
returns to aid; the finding of Dalgaard et al. (2004) that aid is more effec-
tive outside the tropics; and the finding of Angeles and Neanidis (2009)
that aid is more effective in countries with few colonial settlers and, there-
fore, no overly strong elite. In Columns 1 and 2, we add aid squared (AIDit
2)
to our baseline 2SLS and GMM regressions. We note that the coefficients
on AIDit and AIDit × ETHNICi retain the predicted signs and their statisti-
cal significance, while the coefficient on AIDit
2 is significant in Column 2,
but not in Column 1. These results provide further support for our
hypothesis. They moreover suggest that earlier studies may have found
robust evidence for the hypothesis of decreasing returns to aid partly
because more fractionalised countries (paradoxically) tend to receive
more aid (with the correlation between AIDit and ETHNICi being 0.25).
To compare our hypothesis to the finding of Dalgaard et al. (2004), we
add the interaction term AIDit × TROPICSi in Columns 3 and 4. Since we
need to instrument also for this interaction term, we add ARMSit ×
TROPICSi and POPit × TROPICSi to the set of our instruments. Again,
the coefficients on AIDit and AIDit × ETHNICi retain the predicted
signs and their statistical significance at the 10% level. The interaction
term AIDit × TROPICSi has the expected sign and is statistically significant
in column (4), but not in Column 3. While the high correlation between
TROPICSi and ETHNICi, 0.53, tends to inflate the standard errors of
our estimates; these results still allow us to conclude that we are not just
picking up an effect of TROPICSi on aid effectiveness, but a robust and
independent effect of ETHNICi on aid effectiveness.
We finally compare our hypothesis to the findings of Angeles and
Neanidis (2009). In Columns 5 and 6, we add an interaction term
between AIDit and the share of colonial settlers (SETTLERSi), i.e., the
share of the population that was of European origin in colonial times, to
our baseline 2SLS and GMM regressions, and we adjust the set of instru-
ments accordingly. We find that the coefficients on AIDit, AIDit ×
ETHNICi and AIDit × SETTLERSi all have the predicted signs and are stat-
istically significant. These results provide further support for our hypoth-
esis as well as for the hypothesis of Angeles and Neanidis. Hence, foreign
statistically insignificant. This, however, is hardly surprising as the high correlation
between ETHNICi and ORIGTIMEi, which is 0.55, tends to inflate the standard errors.
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aid becomes less effective when there are many rivalling groups as well as
when there exists a strong elite of colonial settlers. These results are consist-
ent with the idea that rent-seeking contests caused by aid inflows get more
detrimental when the number of ethnic groups rises, as well as when the
Table 7: Alternative Determinants of Aid Effectiveness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM
AIDit 2.007 1.156 3.054 1.238 3.298 1.652
(0.041) (0.005) (0.030) (0.000) (0.044) (0.006)
ETHNICi 20.005 0.032 0.012
(0.724) (0.292) (0.633)
AIDit*ETHNICi 21.662 21.274 24.888 21.098 24.319 22.589
(0.080) (0.008) (0.069) (0.057) (0.050) (0.002)
AIDit
2 26.659 24.071
(0.355) (0.085)
TROPICSi 20.018
(0.080)
AIDit*TROPICSi 0.903 20.865
(0.402) (0.000)
SETTLERSi 0.001
(0.034)
AIDit*SETTLERSi 27.831 23.639
(0.028) (0.063)
GDPit YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Regional dummies YES NO YES NO YES NO
Countries 114 114 95 95 95 95
Observations 763 763 710 710 699 699
R2 0.250 — 0.090 — 0.225 —
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.297 0.338 0.320 0.433 0.100 0.551
AR(2) test (p-value) — 0.672 — 0.788 — 0.998
GMM instrument
count
— 74 — 76 — 76
Notes: Dependent variable is GROWTHit. p-values in parentheses are based on robust and
clustered standard errors in 2SLS regressions, and on robust standard errors and the
Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction in GMM regressions. In GMM regressions,
system-GMM is used with the second and third lags of the endogenous variables as
instruments. In all columns, exogenous variables used as instruments include FRZi, CAMi,
EGYi, POPit, POPit
2, POPit*ETHNICi, ARMSit, ARMSit
2 and ARMSit*ETHNICi. In addition,
POPit*TROPICSi and ARMSit*TROPICSi are used in Columns 3–4; and POPit*SETTLERSi and
ARMSit*SETTLERSi are used in Columns 5–6.
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differences in physical appearance across the major ethnic groups grow
larger.
4. Conclusions
Using panel data covering 114 aid-recipient countries over the period 1962
to 2001, we find that foreign aid is effective in promoting economic growth
in ethnically homogenous countries and that higher ethnic fractionalisa-
tion reduces aid effectiveness. Our estimates suggest that foreign aid may
be ineffective or even harmful in many fractionalized countries, most of
which are located in Sub-Saharan Africa. These findings are consistent
with the hypothesis that there is a direct positive effect of foreign aid on
economic growth, which is offset in fractionalised countries in which aid
inflows may provoke detrimental rent-seeking contests.
Our findings have important implications for future foreign aid policy.
They suggest that more focus should be placed on the degree of integration
of distinct groups in a country. If a country is starkly fractionalised, fungi-
ble aid flows without conditions and close oversight may do more harm
than good. A clearer view on practical methods that are effective in coun-
teracting the negative side effects of aid in fractionalised countries would
certainly benefit from further research on a more microeconomic level.
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Appendix A: Data description
AIDit: Constant price effective development assistance relative to constant
price PPP-adjusted GDP, averaged over the years t to t + 3. Source:
Roodman (2004)
ARMSit: Arms imports in US$ divided by current-price PPP-adjusted
GDP, averaged over the years t to t + 3. Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers
Database and Penn World Tables
CAMi: Dummy variable equal to 1 for Central American countries.
Source: Roodman (2004)
CIVILit: Index of civil liberties, ranging from 1 to 7, with higher values
indicating less liberties, averaged over the years t to t + 3. Source: Freedom
House
EGYPTi: Dummy variable equal to 1 for Egypt. Source: Roodman (2004)
ETHNICi: Index of ethnic fractionalization. Source: Alesina et al. (2003)
FRZi: Dummy variable equal to 1 for member countries of the Franc
Zone. Source: Roodman (2004)
GDPit: Constant price PPP-adjusted per capita GDP in year t. Source:
Roodman (2004)
GOVit: Constant price PPP-adjusted government expenditures as a share
of GDP, averaged over the years t to t + 3. Source: Penn World Table 6.3
GROWTHit: Growth rate of constant price PPP-adjusted per capita GDP,
averaged over the years t to t + 3. Source: Roodman (2004)
INVit: Constant price PPP-adjusted investment as a share of GDP, aver-
aged over the years t to t + 3. Source: Penn World Table 6.3
LANGUAGEi: Index of linguistic fractionalization. Source: Alesina et al.
(2003)
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LATITUDEi: Absolute latitude. Source: Gallup et al. (1999)
ODAit
R: Constant price net overseas development assistance relative to
constant price PPP-adjusted GDP, averaged over the years t to t + 3.
Source: Roodman (2004)
ODAit
X: Constant price net overseas development assistance relative to
constant price GDP converted to US$ on an exchange rate basis, averaged
over the years t to t + 3. Source: Roodman (2004)
ORIGTIMEi: Duration of human settlement. Source: Ahlerup and
Olsson (2011)
POLITICALit: Index of political rights, ranging from 1 to 7, with higher
values indicating less rights, averaged over the years t to t + 3. Source:
Freedom House
POPit: Natural logarithm of population, averaged over the years t to t + 3.
Source: Roodman (2004)
RELIGIONi: Index of religious fractionalization. Source: Alesina et al.
(2003)
SETTLERSi: Share of population of European origin in colonial times.
Source: Angeles and Neanidis (2009)
STATEHISTi: State Antiquity Index, which measures the extent to which
a political entity above the tribal level existed in the state’s present territory
in the years 1 to 1950. Source: Putterman (2007)
TRADEit: Total trade relative to GDP in constant price PPP-adjusted
terms, averaged over the years t to t + 3. Source: Penn World Tables 6.3
TROPICSi: Fraction of a country’s area located in the tropics. Source:
Gallup et al. (1999)
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